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Abstract 
Extending Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) analysis of unemployment as a worker discipline 
device, we evidence how an economy populated by worker owned firms (WOFs), by 
overcoming information asymmetry on the employee side in the presence of employer 
opportunism (as embodied in moral hazard, hidden action and abuse of authority), can 
decrease, not increase equilibrium wages, while employment is necessarily higher in the 
presence of WOFs. Within the Shapiro and Stiglitz framework, our analysis evidences that 
the non-shirking constraint (NSC) for WOFs is lower for any employment and wage level 
than in investor owned firms (IOFs). By factoring bi-later asymmetric information and 
opportunism in the employment relation, our model implies that the Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) results represent special cases in the wider analysis of equilibrium wages and 
employment in market economies. Relatedly, the potential for unemployment reduction and 
efficiency gain of worker ownership (as especially embodied in worker co-operatives, and 
employee-owned companies) has generally been understudied and empirical evidence 
coherent with this results need to be more thoroughly analysed. 
 
Key words: efficiency wage; contract failure; asymmetric information; moral hazard; worker 
owned enterprises. 
JEL codes: D21, D86; J31, J54; J64 
 Extended abstract 
Shapiro and Stiglitz model (1984) shows that worker owned firms (WOFs) can reach the Pareto 
optimal level of equilibrium unemployment. This same result cannot be achieved by firms in which 
workers and owners occupy different positions in the agency relation. In the case in which owners and 
workers coincide, Shapiro and Stiglitz demonstrate that the equilibrium level of unemployment is 
lower and wages are higher than in other enterprise forms. This macroeconomic equilibrium in the 
presence of WOFs corresponds to the implications of the Ward-Domar-Vanek model of the labour 
managed firm. However, the empirical evidence shows that this result is not always observed, since 
WOFs tend most often to show lower, not higher than average equilibrium wages.  
We strive to disentangle this empirical puzzle by observing that economic theory considers only 
asymmetric information impacting on equilibrium wages on the employee side of the employment 
relation. It does not consider the impact of information asymmetry on the employer side. We consider 
contract failures derived from the latter case of information imperfection, working out a more general 
model in which the equilibrium level of wages in the presence of WOFs can be lower than in investor 
owned enterprises. In line with existing literature, we confirm that in WOFs the risk of worker 
opportunism, with workers reducing effort when not properly controlled, is lower than in investor 
owned firms, given the absence of contrasting interests between owners and workers.  
Extending Shapiro and Stiglitz’s analysis of unemployment as a worker discipline device, we 
evidence how an economy populated by worker owned firms (WOFs), by overcoming information 
asymmetry on the employee side in the presence of employer opportunism (as embodied in moral 
hazard, hidden action and abuse of authority), can decrease, not increase equilibrium wages, while 
employment is necessarily higher in the presence of WOFs. Within the Shapiro and Stiglitz 
framework, our analysis evidences that the non-shirking constraint (NSC) for WOFs is lower for any 
employment and wage level than in investor owned firms (IOFs). By factoring bi-later asymmetric 
information and opportunism in the employment relation, our model implies that the Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) results represent special cases in the wider analysis of equilibrium wages and 
employment in market economies. Relatedly, the potential for unemployment reduction and efficiency 
gain of worker ownership (as especially embodied in worker co-operatives, and employee-owned 
companies) has generally been understudied and empirical evidence coherent with this results need to 
be more thoroughly analysed.  
 
Key words: efficiency wage; contract failure; asymmetric information; moral hazard; worker 
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1. Introduction 
The Ward (1958) model was introduced to study the behavior of worker co-operatives in a 
former Yuguslav-type economic environment. It assumes average labor income maximization 
as the objective per worker-member in co-operatives. Since members are entrepreneurs and 
control strategic and distributive decisions, they appropriate the whole value added (net of the 
cost of capital). When competition is not perfect (pure profits are positive), members in co-
operatives obtain a higher income relative to employees in investor owned companies, since 
they appropriate the competitive equilibrium amount of labor remuneration plus a share of 
pure profits.  
The Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model on unemployment as worker discipline device 
shows that worker owned firms (WOFs) can achieve the Pareto optimal level of equilibrium 
unemployment since, when the owners coincide with the workers employed by the 
organization, the equilibrium level of unemployment is lower and wages are higher than in 
investor owned companies. The macroeconomic equilibrium presented by Shapiro and 
Stiglitz in the presence of WOFs corresponds to the implications of the Ward-Domar-Vanek- 
model.
1
 In the paper we present a more general model in which the macroeconomic 
equilibrium level of wages in the presence of WOFs can be both higher and lower than the 
economy wide level, contrary to the Shapiro and Stiglitz prediction. 
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 In the Ward (1958) model, given competitive market conditions for all firms, worker controlled firms would 
hire less workers at higher wages than their investor owned counterparts. The reason is that, under the 
assumption of perfect variability of labour in the short run, worker owned firms maximize average per member 
income when marginal labour productivity is equal to average labour productivity, and not to the competitive 
wage like in the case of capitalist enterprises.      
  In particular, we demonstrate, in line with existing literature by Bowles and Gintis 
(1993, 1998), that in the worker co-operative the risk of worker opportunism, with workers 
reducing effort when not properly controlled, is lower than in the capitalistic firm.
2
 In this 
case we can show that in worker co-operatives the non-shirking constraint (NSC) is lower for 
any employment and wage level than in capitalist enterprises. Some pieces of (indirect) 
empirical evidence are supportive of this argument (Bartlett et al., 1992).  
Before we develop our argument, we criticize the microeconomic rationale for lower 
wages in worker co-operatives due to x-inefficiency of the production process on the basis of 
both theoretical and empirical insights. From the theoretical viewpoint, while notable 
contributions warned against the risk of the spread of free riding (sub-optimal effort 
contribution) in teamwork (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), we notice that horizontal control in 
the form of peer monitoring can be more effective in limiting free riding than hierarchical 
control by superiors (Putterman, 1993), the more so when peer monitoring is coupled with 
positive reciprocity (McCain, 2007). On the other hand, contrary to hierarchical control, 
horizontal control has the potential to improve the circulation of efficiency enhancing 
information, this way better supporting the generation of novel production knowledge. These 
arguments imply that worker and producer co-operatives would be able to reduce, not 
increase, control costs, this way boosting x-efficiency, for example because of lower need to 
resort to monitoring activities and lower costs of access to information (Hansmann, 1996, 
1999).
3
  
The model delivers three main implications: 
1) A co-operative economy is always characterized, other conditions being equal, 
by higher employment levels than a capitalist economy; 
                                                          
2
 The worker co-operative is to be considered the most representative case of worked owned enterprise. 
However, the category of worker owned enterprises is wider, since it includes capitalistic companies owned by 
their employees alone. Oco-operativeur arguments apply to this second category too. In this paper we use 
interchangeably the two terms for the sake of simplicity. In a similar fashion, we use interchangeably the terms 
investor owned and capitalistic enterprises.    
3
 The same new-institutionalist account, however, warns against the risk that democratic governance in co-
operatives increases governance costs, especially collective decision making costs (Hansmann, 1990, 1996). In a 
similar fashion to Bowles and Gintis (1993, p. 79), “while we take account of the work monitoring costs in both 
types of firms, we abstract from the costs of democratic decision making, expressed both in the time spent by 
participants and in the possible drawbacks of cyclicity in voting, unresponsiveness, and susceptibility to 
manipulation”. 
 2) In competitive sectors co-operative firms pay lower wages than capitalist 
enterprises.  
3) The risk of unemployment is higher in capitalist firms than in worker co-
operatives.  
These results are implied by the existence of contrasting interests between employers 
and employees: in order to increase control over workers, this way reducing the probability of 
shirking, and to win workers’ obedience, employers in a capitalist economy are forced to pay 
higher equilibrium wages, this way causing higher equilibrium unemployment. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we report stylized facts related to 
unemployment and wage levels in co-operatives and in investor owned enterprises; in the 
second paragraph we explain the theoretical background of our analysis; in the third 
paragraph we report the Shapiro and Stiglitz model, as applied to worker owned firms; and in 
the fourth and fifth paragraphs we describe our model and introduce new parameters 
representing the costs of employers’ opportunism. In the sixth paragraph we summarize the 
comparative results related to WOFs and IOFs, which are derived from our model, .  
 
2.  Stylized facts 
Shapiro and Stiglitz’s prediction on equilibrium wages and unemployment partially clash 
with pieces of empirical evidence which, in most studies, show higher wages in capitalist 
enterprises when compared to worker co-operatives. Bartlett et al. (1992) compare similar 
groups of co-operative and investor owned enterprises in the industrial sector in Italy, finding 
that worker co-operatives pay lower wages than investor owned companies (IOFs hereafter), 
mainly due to mangers’ reduced pay and, to lower extent, to lower white-collars pay.4 Their 
focus is on light manufacturing industrial sectors which are, on average, highly competitive 
since they are populated by small and medium sized enterprises, and the Italian industrial 
sector was, at the time of the study, one of the largest and most competitive in western 
countries. Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2006), using employee matched panel data 
including all Italian firms, show that worker co-operatives are only apparently characterized 
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 The ratio of managerial pay to unskilled manual pay was almost 75% higher in private firms than in co-
operatives. This difference is primarily attributable to the significantly lower salaries paid to the managerial staff 
in co-operatives; wage rates for the unskilled, skilled, and supervisory workers did not differ significantly 
between the two types of firm (ibid.: 110). 
 by higher wages than IOFs: once controlling for a set of characteristics, especially for the 
sector of activity, co-operatives display wages that are on average 14% lower than in IOFs. 
Using Eurostat data and data on a smaller sample of North-Eastern Italian enterprises 
(province of Ravenna, Emilia-Romagna region), Navarra (2016) notices that co-operatives 
pay lower wages than the average market wages in the area, with the exception of the 
construction sector, in which co-operatives hold significant market power.  This evidence is 
not limited to Italy: Craig, Pencavel, Farber and Krueger (1995) show that co-operative 
wages in the plywood lumberjack co-operatives of US Pacific North West are 2% lower than 
wages in capitalist firms of similar size in the same sector. Clemente, Diaz-Foncea, 
Marcuello and Sanso-Navarro (2012) address the issue of the wage gap between co-
operatives and capitalistic firms in the case of Spain. They observe that wages in worker-
owned co-operative firms are lower than in other organization types. This result holds across 
sectors, while it does not always hold when co-operatives owned by stakeholders different 
from workers are considered. The result is also confirmed by the quintile analysis of the wage 
gap: wages in worker-owned co-operatives are always lower than in capitalist firms, while 
the opposite applies to non-worker-owned co-operatives when higher quintiles are 
considered. In the broader comparison between capitalist firms and all the typologies of co-
operatives (including both worker and non-worker owned co-operatives), results are affected 
by sector. The same contribution explains low wages by the need to stabilize employment. 
However, while employment stabilization can explain higher wage flexibility, it is more 
difficult to show a causal connection between employment stabilization and the level of 
wages. While we keep in mind this possibility, we do not develop this hypothesis in the 
reminder of the paper. 
In the following, we will concentrate exclusively on worker co-operatives ad develop an 
explanation of why lower wages are found in co-operatives in most cases, except when the 
market for the firm products is characterized by substantial imperfections. Lower wages 
require explanation either at the microeconomic, intra-organizational level, by introducing the 
idea of x-inefficiency in worker-co-operatives, or at the macroeconomic level by introducing 
in a partial equilibrium context those features of co-operatives that would favour this 
outcome. In this paper we criticize the former, and we follow instead the latter perspective.  
Our explanatory strategy is supported by broad empirical evidence that disconfirmed the 
presence of lower production efficiency in worker co-operatives. Craig and Pencavel (1992, 
1994) and Craig et al. (1995) compare US plywood co-operatives with similar IOFs. They 
 find slightly higher labour productivity and technical efficiency (between 6 and 14 per cent) 
in co-operatives relative to both unionized and non-unionized investor owned mills. Estrin 
(1991), on the Italian case, finds, in worker co-operatives, higher labor productivity, which, 
however, doesn’t translate into higher wages. Bartlett et al. (1992) find better economic, but 
not financial performance in co-operatives relative to IOFs in the industrial sector in Italy. 
This evidence is mainly explained with at least three distinct organizational features of co-
operatives, which would lower organizational costs and increase worker welfare and 
productivity: (i) lower incidence of control cost in terms of flatter hierarchical structure and 
lower utilization of intermediate clerical positions devoted to monitoring activities; (ii) lower 
costs of conflict, especially lower incidence of strikes, other forms industrial action, and 
sabotage in co-operatives; (iii) better forms of worker involvement through membership 
representation. Better involvement, in turn, would favor better circulation of information, 
creation of firm specific knowledge, and weaker incidence of worker opportunistic behavior 
(e.g. shirking).    
Related evidence deal with the well-established and widely studied phenomenon of 
employment stabilization that occurs in co-operatives and employee owned companies 
(Kruse, 2016). Since workers are reported to value strongly employment stability (Guest, 
2002; Depedri, Carpita and Tortia, 2012), increased stability would correspond, ceteris 
paribus, to increased worker welfare, which can translate into lower absenteeism and 
turnover, and in increased productivity. Most empirical works show that WOFs face demand 
shocks by avoiding layoffs and, in order to reduce layoffs, they let wages fluctuate more than 
their capitalist counterparts (Kruse, 2016). In the Uruguayan case, this is highlighted by 
Burdin and Dean (2009) and Alves, Burdin and Dean (2014). Both works find that output 
prices affect employment in IOFs, but not in worker co-operatives. Burdin and Dean (2009) 
consider the economy wide comparison between worker co-operatives and IOFs in Uruguay 
in the decade spanning from 1996 to 2005. They find substantially more pronounced 
variation in wages in co-operatives relative to conventional enterprises. The stark difference 
in wage dynamics is explained by the necessity for co-operatives to preserve stable 
employment in the face of economic fluctuation and crisis, which, in this country, started in 
2001. The same finding concerining less volatile employment and more volatile wages is 
found in Pencavel, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2006) on Italian data. Using survey data from the 
Ravenna province in Central Italy, Navarra (2016) finds that, in co-operatives, employment 
variation doesn’t follow firm revenues, while wages in some cases do. Moreover, Arando et 
 al. (2010) show much better performance in employment creation and preservation of the 
Mondragon group of co-operatives than the average of the whole Spanish economy (both 
inside and outside the Basque Region) from 1983 to 2009. This is confirmed by the analysis 
of firm performance during the economic crises occurred over the same span of time, since it 
is observed that co-operatives adjusted less (or didn’t adjust) employment to reduced firm 
performance. In the same paper, we see that during the economic crisis of 2009, industrial co-
operatives in Mondragon laid off less than 1% of their worker-members
5
. This result has been 
achieved mainly thanks to relevant degrees of wage and working-hour flexibility for 
members. Following the financial crisis in 2007-2008, total employment in Mondragon fell 
by about 9% (most lay-offs were represented by temporary non-member workers), as 
compared to about 20% in Spain and 12% in the Basque Region. Over the whole considered 
period Mondragon co-operatives shoed better than average propensity to create, but not 
reduce employment.  
More recent reports dealing with the effects of the global financial crisis started in 2007 
show that, in Italy, from fall 2008 to the end of 2013, co-operatives increased overall 
employment by 80 thousand workers, while employment in private enterprises shrank by 
about 473 thousand units out of a national total of about 22 million. Still more remarkably, in 
co-operatives, the number of permanent workers increased by about 100 thousand, while 
short term contracts fell by about 20 thousand. About 50 per cent of total increased 
employment in co-operatives is accounted for by socially-oriented co-operatives, the so-
called social co-operatives (Euricse 2015). Delbono and Reggiani (2013) analyze a group of 
Italian production co-operatives in the periods 2003-2010 and 1994-2011 and contrast co-ops 
behaviour with the overall trend in the same sectors. They find a stabilising effect on 
employment with respect to demand shocks, thanks to adjustments of wages. Moreover, co-
operatives have been more cautious in terms of increasing equity during good years by way 
of reinvestment of positive residuals in indivisible reserves of capital (asset lock) and show 
“stronger” than average patrimony during downturns. The 2012 CECOP report confirms the 
high level of co-operative resilience to the financial and economic crisis. Focusing on France 
and Spain, the report argues that, although co-operatives have not been spared by the crisis, 
they have been able to limit firm closures and lay-offs better than the average business, in 
some cases even restoring a job creation pattern. This effect is stronger where some peculiar 
features of co-operatives are strengthened by legislation or by-laws, for example through the 
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 Laid-off members were still paid 80% of their wages.  
 partial imposition of the non-profit distribution constraint and the accumulation of locked 
assets, and through the creation of co-operative groups and consortia, and of mutualized 
financial tools.  
Further research, albeit rarer, systematically compares unemployment levels in areas 
characterized by different intensity of worker co-operative presence. Descriptive evidence 
shows higher employment levels in sectors and areas where worker managed firms are more 
common. In Italy, areas characterized by the strongest presence of co-operative enterprises,
6
 
which are concentrated in Central Italy (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche 
regions) and North-Eastern Italy (Trentino Alto-Adige, Veneto, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
regions) do also show lower than average unemployment levels (Euricse, 2015).
7
 Although 
not usable to directly test our model, this evidence is compatible with the idea that the spread 
of co-operative enterprises reduces, ceteris paribus, involuntary unemployment.  
 
3.Theoretical background 
Our theoretical argument starts from the observation that worker co-operatives, when 
compared with IOFs, are able to reduce the costs connected to labor contracts by: (i) reducing 
control costs thanks to: (a) improved horizontal monitoring, which reduces the presence and 
spread of shirking and free riding on effort contribution; (b) reduced vertical control and costs 
of agency thanks to substitution of vertical with horizontal control; (ii) eschewing the risk of 
exploitative labor relations, i.e. of employers behaving opportunistically by exploiting 
asymmetric information and decision making power, primarily to keep wages low and to 
                                                          
6
 The figures concerning the diffusion of co-operative enterprises in Italy refer to both producer, and consumer 
owned co-operatives. However, worker involvement and direct participation can be thought to be more 
widespread in all typologies of co-operatives than in IOFs, through the weakening of financial incentives to 
profit maximization and through union and worker representatives’ involvement in the management of the 
organization. Furthermore, workers can be members not only in worker co-operatives, but also in other co-
operative forms, for example in social and credit co-operatives.    
7
 In contrast with a national average of 12.2% in 2014, the seven selected regions all show lower than average 
unemployment levels. From lowest to highest: Trentino Alto-Adige, 5.5%; Friuli Venezia Giulia, 7.6%; Veneto, 
7.7%; Emilia-Romagna, 8.4%; Tuscany, 8.7%; Umbria, 10.5%; Marche, 11%. These seven regions include the 
three regions with the lowest unemployment rate in Italy (Trentino Alto-Adige, Friuli Venezia-Giulia and 
Veneto) and also include seven among the eleven regions (out of a total of twenty) with the lowest 
unemployment rate in Italy (Urbistat on ISTAT data, retrieved on October 7
th
, 2015, from: 
http://www.urbistat.it/adminstat/it/it/classifiche/tasso-disoccupazione/regioni/italia/380/1 ). 
 increase work pace (Albanese, Navarra and Tortia, 2015).  Appropriation of net residuals by 
investors increases with decreasing wages and increasing work pace. Workers can anticipate 
and react to the danger of exploitative labour relations by demanding higher wages and by 
limiting effort contribution. In other words, the risk of employers behaving in a morally 
hazardous way and abusing their authority can lead workers’ to reduce effort and employers’ 
to strengthen control or to increase wages to counteract this possibility (Sacconi, 2012). 
However, when workers cannot be perfectly monitored because of asymmetric information 
and/or contract incompleteness, unemployment can be interpreted as a worker discipline 
device. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), higher efficiency wages causing non-zero 
equilibrium unemployment are paid to dissuade workers from shirking. The NSC is shifted 
left and upwards, since monetary incentives (higher wages) and a more severe threat of lay-
off substitute increased monitoring activities (Crf. also Albanese et al., 2015). Coherently, a 
co-operative economy in which workers have control over entrepreneurial decisions, since 
this condition reduces asymmetric information on worker behaviour, and the danger of the 
employer behaving opportunistically, would be characterized by the NSC shifting downward 
and to the rights, implying this way lower unemployment and wages. We dissect these 
theoretical premises of our model in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.1. Costs of control and costs of monitoring 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) introduced one of the most radical critiques against the 
possibility that teamwork led by a set of principals would be able to deliver efficient 
production. When the outcome of team production cannot be exactly imputed to each 
individual worker, free riding, in a way similar to contribution to public goods production, is 
likely to spread, leading to inefficiently low provision of effort. Only the presence of a central 
monitor endowed with strong monetary incentives which consist, in the standard case, in 
being the residual claimant or enterprise owner, can remedy the intrinsic inefficiency of team 
production. The authors explain in this way the emergence of capitalist ownership as the 
conjunct result of profit maximization by the owner and of tight control over the labour 
process. Within the same stream, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) maintain that team production, 
in which residual rights of appropriation are attributed to member principals, requires strong 
sanctions to be imposed on defecting members in order to discourage opportunism.  
 While dealing with the same problem of control over the labour process, a line of enquire 
at odd with Alchian and Demsetz’s one was initiated by authors such as Putterman (1984), 
Bowles and Gintis (1987). They evidenced that the role of the central monitor does not need 
to imply residual claimancy. It can be carried out effectively by other institutionalized 
agencies, such as appointed managers or elected directors. In more general terms, the new 
institutionalist approach of Elinor Ostrom (1990) showed that, contrary to the well-know 
thesis of Mancur Olson (1965), in many actual situations groups of principals can solve social 
dilemmas such as the spread of opportunism in collective action. This is achieved through a 
complex and time consuming process of development of suitable governance structures, 
which include both incentives (monetary and non-monetary) and sanctions against offenders. 
Empirical research first developed in the field of the management of common pools of natural 
resources evidenced that appropriate governance and working rules can sustain co-operation 
over long periods of time.  
The literature initiated by Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) demonstrated the 
existence and the importance of agency costs in principal agent interactions. This approach 
complements the one by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) within the tradition 
seeing the firm as a nexus of contracts, since, in the presence of asymmetric information, 
agency costs are thought to be minimized by resorting to highly powered monetary 
incentives, such as different forms of profit sharing and pay for performance. However, since 
it deals with second best organizational equilibria, it also leaves open the possibility that 
social structures different from principal agent interactions achieve Pareto superior outcomes. 
Our arguments develop within this line of enquire.  
The economics literature that specialized in the study of worker owned and worker 
controlled enterprises (Bowles and Gintis, 1998) demonstrated that in worker co-operatives 
the risk of worker opportunism, with workers reducing effort when not properly controlled, is 
lower than in capitalistic firms, and mutual monitoring is a stronger instrument than 
hierarchical control in reducing the incidence of shirking and free riding. Following a 
different but converging explanatory strategy, also new institutionalism reached similar 
conclusions, especially in the works by Henry Hansmann (1996). Organizational costs in 
terms of agency and control costs would be lower in producer and worker co-operatives 
thanks to reduced information asymmetry and horizontal (peer) monitoring. This effect would 
be especially strong when members’ features and preferences are homogeneous, since in this 
case their monitoring ability would be strongest, and coordination in the pursuit of collective 
 objectives easier and less costly. In the presence of heterogeneous membership, instead, more 
complex governance solutions suited to reconciling different and possibly divergent 
members’ objectives would be needed (Albanese, 2016; Borzaga and Tortia, 2017).  
In our framework of analysis, co-operatives represent an instance of collective action in 
the pursuit of entrepreneurial objectives, substituting principal agent relations with mutual 
benefit interaction. While principal agent interaction requires that the agent’s objectives are 
aligned to the principal’s ones by resorting to highly powered monetary incentives, second 
best solutions can reduce, but never eliminate agency costs (Prendergast, 1999). Co-
operatives can reduce agency costs by resorting to horizontal control and better alignment 
between individual and organizational objectives. This is achieved through worker 
involvement and participation in decision making.   
 
2.2. Labour Contract failures 
2.2.1. Contrasting interests and hierarchical relations 
The idea of contrasting interests between employers and employees can be enlarged and 
made to depend on the hierarchical relation existing between them, as spelled out by new 
institutionalist classics (Coase, 1937, Simon, 1951) and formalized in the principal-agent 
relation (Jensen and Mackling, 1976). The different and opposing objectives between 
employers and employees imply that employees may want to pursue aims that are at odd with 
the employer’s ones, engendering effort reductions whenever wokers’ demands are not met 
by employers. As a reaction, employers can leverage on efficiency wages and the threat of 
unemployment to disciplining workers.  
Given the existence of asymmetric information and contrasting interests between 
employers and employees, workers in IOFs may not accept wage reductions or moderation 
since they may not be able to ascertain whether wage moderation is required by the financial 
and economic sustainability of the organization (e.g. to avoid bankruptcy), or it is instead a 
way to increase private appropriation by shareholder-owners (Albanese et al., 2014). Besides, 
lower wages in IOFs imply higher profits, increased distributive disparity, and increased 
concentration of wealth (Piketty, 2013). The demand for wage increases may represent a way 
to reduce wealth inequality within the organization, and improve distributive fairness among 
workers themselves. Because of these reasons, workers in IOFs may show a tendency to 
increase wage demands by threatening lower productivity levels. In turn, employers can react 
 by increasing the equilibrium level of the wage, but, at the same time, by using equilibrium 
unemployment as threat to discipline workers. This upward profit to wage spiral can 
engender higher risk of lay-offs when the economic conditions of the organization worsen. 
Consequently, too high wage demands by workers, and concessionary behaviour by 
employers, can aggravate business cycle fluctuations at the macroeconomic level.  
The existence and relevance of economic (in terms of danger of wage reductions aimed at 
increasing profits) and psychological costs (in terms of the need to align their behaviour to 
the employer’s objectives) to the employment relation has, most of the times, not been 
analysed by orthodox economics (Prendergast, 1999). Some behavioural economists, instead, 
have explicitly considered the costs connected with the imposition of hetero-directed 
objectives on workers. Bruno Frey (1997) bases his seminal work on previous contributions 
in social psychology (Deci, 1971; 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985), and highlights the existence 
of the crowding out of intrinsic motivations by monetary incentives. This effect can be 
thought as primarily connected with hetero-direction in labour relations, since employees are 
not allowed, as a norm, to select autonomously their preferred tasks, while monetary 
incentives can be used by employers as alignment devices, which negatively impact on 
workers’ intrinsic motivations. Furthermore, the employer’s objectives and choices may not 
always be aligned with the optimal accumulation of human capital along the lifecycle of the 
worker. Short sighted choices dictated by the necessity to maximize profits can reduce 
investment in training and development of new skills.  
In worker co-operatives hierarchy is partly of fully substituted by direct worker control 
based on membership rights, horizontal monitoring and collective action. When present, 
hierarchy is left with a purely instrumental role in serving members’ objectives, since it is 
based on delegation of decision making power to elected bodies and to appointed managers 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2017; Ellerman, 2017). Consequently, the negative impact of hierarchy 
on workers’ welfare and psychological wellbeing is expected to be impoverished and 
downgraded relative to IOFs.  
Since members in worker co-operatives set strategic and operational objectives (either 
directly or in a delegated way), they are, as a norm, in a better position than employees in 
IOFs to align their own objectives with the objectives of the organization, and to set the 
optimal schedule for the inter-temporal accumulation of human capital. In our model, better 
alignment and lower hierarchical intensity imply lower incidence of worker misbehaviour in 
 terms of shirking, and absence or lower incidence of compensatory wage demands by 
workers, that is a level of equilibrium wage that is nearer to the market clearing one. 
 
2.2.2. Employer opportunism: moral hazard, hidden action and abuse of authority  
Some authors (Ben-Ner, 1988; Screpanti, 2001; Dow, 2003) evidenced that ex-post 
opportunism in the employment relation in not alien to the employer, not only to the 
employee side of the relation. The employer can, in the most common instances, diffuse 
wrong, biased, or incomplete information concerning the economic and financial conditions 
of the organization in order to increase profits by reducing wages or halting their growth. The 
employer can also, for the same reason,  start too risky investment plans when expected 
losses, but not gains, are born by workers in terms of higher risk of lay-off. One salient 
consequence of such features of the employment relation is that workers are likely to prefer 
fixed to fluctuating wages, since fixed wages represent a better guarantee against the risk of 
employers behaving opportunistically to increase profits (Albanese et al., 2014). The same 
effect can be obtained when the employer exploits contract incompleteness to abuse his/her 
authority and impose worse contractual conditions on workers, for example by requiring 
increased work pace. This problem has been evidenced in related research streams which 
built on the idea of corporate social responsibility. In this stream, abuse of authority is 
understood as the main failure in the social contract between the owners of the organization 
and the other stakeholder groups. This failure requires the introduction of both legal 
regulation and self-regulation aimed at developing multi-stakeholder governance (Blair and 
Stout, 1999; Sacconi, 2012). Direct worker control can be understood as similar, but more 
radical and thorough solution to the same problem.  
Coherently with these arguments, it can be hypothesized that workers internalize the 
expected costs of employer opportunism concerning higher risks of lay off, lower than 
equilibrium wages, suboptimal accumulation of human capital, limited involvement, and 
limited access to sensitive information (Albanese et al., 2015). This process of internalization 
would lead to the demand for compensatory wage increases. In other words, against the risk 
of employer’s opportunism, workers may show a higher propensity to reduce effort unless 
some monetary compensation is paid as insurance in the form of wage premium. In turn, the 
employer may prefer concessionary wage bargaining in order to prevent shirking and other 
forms of misbehaviour. The resulting equilibrium level of efficiency wages would be higher 
 in IOFs than in worker co-operatives. Both workers’ and employers’ behaviour would 
conjure in determining inefficient market equilibrium.   
 
4. The Shapiro-Stiglitz model, as applied to worker ownership 
In their efficiency-wage framework, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show that involuntary 
unemployment can be compatible with the equilibrium of the labour market, when the 
monitoring of the work activity is not perfect. This kind of involuntary unemployment is not 
due to workers’ unwillingness to accept salaries lower than the current ones, but to the 
employers’ unwillingness to lower wages down to the market clearing level to eschew the 
risk of workers shirking on effort contribution. Shapiro and Stiglitz make four assumptions: 
(i) the information available to entrepreneurs is imperfect as workers can perform “hidden 
actions”; (ii) entrepreneurs can only imperfectly monitor the commitment of workers; (iii) 
each worker decides his or her level of effort; (iv) each worker who is caught shirking is 
fired. All workers and firms are identical and there is perfect information about job 
availability. The employer sets wages at a level high enough to prevent shirking: this means 
that efficiency wages are understood as “worker discipline” device (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984). Work effort can take two values (0,1): e = 1 in the case of “fair” effort and e = 0 in the 
case of shirking. The firm chooses the wage level w and the level of employment Li. The firm 
knows the future expected utility of each worker in the event he or she chooses e = 0 or e = 1.  
The worker utility function is U(w,e), where w is the wage and e is work effort. Standard 
assumptions on the shape of the utility function apply (that is 0/  wU  and 0/  eU ). 
The probability that the worker is caught shirking following monitoring activities is q. The 
worker found shirking is laid-off and, in this case, he or she would receive a subsidy equal to 
w  up until he or she does not find a new job. Each unemployed worker is able to find a new 
job with probability a, corresponding to 1 minus the unemployment rate, that is a = 1− u = 1 
- (N−L)/N = L/N, where L is the number of employed workers, while N is the total active 
workforce (that is 10;0  aNL ). The a probability grows larger with total employment 
and decreases with the unemployment rate. The probability that a worker is separated from 
his or her job due to relocation is b, which is exogenous. 
Workers maximize the expected present discounted value of their utility with discount rate 
equal to r > 0. The model is set in continuous time. Workers select their effort level to 
maximize their discounted utility stream. As in the Shapiro and Stiglitz model, the worker 
 compares his expected utility in the two alternative states of “shirking” and “non-shirking”. 
The one period expected utility is expressed as sum of the utility of the current period plus 
the probability of state change multiplied by the change in expected utility. The employer 
knows that these utilities can act in such a way to induce workers to engage in his or her 
preferred action (non-shirking). To this end, the employer can leverage on q (the probability 
of lay-off) and w (the wage): he or she can either tighten control (increase q) or incentivize 
the worker by means of higher w. The Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984, pag. 438) no-shirking condition 
(NSC) is: 
 
q
e
r+b+a+e+ww                   (1) 
The critical wage level corresponding to non-shirking behaviour is greater: (i) the smaller the 
detection probability q; (ii) the larger the effort level e; (iii) the higher the quit rate b; (iv) the 
higher the interest rate r; (v) the higher the unemployment benefit w ; (vi) the larger the flow 
out of unemployment a.  
If, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, we set:  
LN
L
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
                       (2) 
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As concerns WOFs, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, pag. 439) analyse the case in which the 
owners of the firm are the same N individuals who are employed by it, and ownership is 
equally distributed among the N workers. They assume in this case that the value of the 
unemployment benefit w is zero8. In this case, the problem to be solved by the employer is:  
 Lew                       (4) 
subject to 
q
e
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N
bew 

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

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
                    (5) 
and  LFwL                       (6) 
The optimal equilibrium occurs at point A in Figure 1 where the NSC intersects the schedule 
of the average product of labour w = F(L)/L. This result concerning WOFs is different from 
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The reason is that increases in w tighten the NSC, so all payments are made in the form of w rather than w . 
 the market equilibrium in which workers are employed by investor owned companies, which 
occurs at E, where the marginal product of labour schedule intersects the NSC.    
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Shapiro and Stilgitz (1984) demonstrate that when workers own the firm, the equilibrium 
level of unemployment is lower and wages are higher than in other enterprise forms
9
. The 
macroeconomic equilibrium in the presence of WOFS corresponds to the implications of the 
Ward (1958), Domar (1966), Vanek (1970) model of the labour managed firm. However, 
empirical evidence shows that this implication of the model is often violated, since worker 
cooperatives have been observed several times to pay lower, not higher than average 
equilibrium wages. We develop a more complete explanatory model aimed at bridging the 
gap between Shapiro and Stiglitz explanation, and empirical evidence. 
 
5. Wage setting and unemployment in worker owned enterprises 
In the Shapiro and Stiglitz model the parameter q is the probability that the worker is caught 
shirking and fired by the employer. When asymmetric information is less severe, or the 
monitoring activity becomes more effective or intensive, the worker performs high effort 
anyway even if the employer pays a lower wage. The incentive to shirk is reduced.  
In line with Bowles and Gintis (1987, 1998), we posit that, in WOFs, peer pressure and 
peer monitoring underpin horizontal forms of control, thus increasing the value of q.   
Furthermore, involvement, by better aligning workers’ and organizational objectives, reduces 
workers’ misbehaviour, this way making monitoring activities easier and more effective (q 
increases also in this case). Insofar as involvement based on membership rights is understood 
as means to overcome the contrasting interests between the employer and the employee, it 
represents one fundamental mechanism able to explain the lower incidence of worker 
opportunism in worker co-operatives (Bartlett et al., 1992).  
In the Shapiro and Stiglitz framework, it is assumed that ownership is equally distributed 
among N workers and that the value of the unemployment benefit w is zero. In this case the 
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 This induces the two authors to affirm that wages should be subsidized using “whatever (pure) profits can be 
taxed away” (ibid., p. 440). 
 problem is the same as in (4), (5) and (6). In Figure 2, when the value of q increases the NSC 
moves downward and rightward to NSC’ and the new equilibrium is found in A’, where 
employment is higher and the wage lower than in A. The stronger the effect of self-
monitoring on q, the larger the downward shift of the NSC.   
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Our results imply that the Shapiro and Stiglitz (S-S hereafter) representation is a special case 
of a wider class of equilibria, which depend on the variables impacting on position of the 
NSC in different organizational forms. If the value of q is the same in traditional firms and in 
worker owned firms the equilibrium point is A, as in the S-S model. If, instead, the value of q 
is higher in co-operatives, the new equilibrium is in A’ with higher employment and lower 
wage in co-operatives relative to traditional firms.  
 
5. Employer opportunism 
The effects discussed in the previous section can explain the oft-found empirical observation 
of lower wages paid by worker-owned firms relative to investor owned firms. The discussion 
of this result, however, can be further extended, including the analysis of not only monitoring 
activities, but also of the role of different forms of employer opportunism in the presence of 
contrasting interests in the employment relation.  
When employer opportunism in the form of moral hazard, hidden action and abuse of 
authority connected with contractual power is considered, similar conclusions on equilibrium 
wages and employment are reached. The idea underlying this extension of the analysis it that 
workers, fearing that the employer would exploit privileged information and contractual 
power to his own advantage, can be induced to demand a higher salary compensating the risk 
of employer opportunism. In turn, the employer would concede wage increases in order to 
keep the worker on the non-shirking schedule. Given the different nature of control rights in 
worker co-operatives, worker members are in a better position to control the behaviour of 
decision makers (managers). This would eliminate the need to demand compensatory wage 
increases, and take the NSC nearer to the market clearing equilibrium in point A’, like in the 
previous cases.  
 In our model, we assume that the NSC includes a new parameter, d, which signals the 
presence of contractual failures connected with contrasting interests (c); hierarchical control 
(h); employer opportunism (m) as discussed in Section 2.2. These failures translate into 
workers’ demand for a wage premium that compensates the risk of losses both in monetary 
and non-monetary terms, as measured by d. In formulas:  
),,( mhcfd 
 
where c measures the cost of contrasting interests, h the cost of hierarchical control and m 
the cost of employer opportunism. 
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The no-shirking condition (NSC) in case of the IOF is: 
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                       (7) 
subject to:  LFwL '
 
We recall that in the case of worker-owned firms the equation of the NSC is (5). In this case 
we sum the value of parameter d to the elements that increase the minimum level of the non-
shirking wage.
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 The NSC in the case of WOFs amounts to: 
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Where N/(N-L )= u is the unemployment rate. That is:
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subject to:  LFwL  . 
Under these hypotheses, the NSC slides upward if d, the premium for the costs of 
contractual failures, increases. In this case, equilibrium unemployment and the equilibrium 
wage increase.  
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 We assume that parameter d, which represents the impact of contract failures on the NSC,  is separable from 
the other parameters of the model, that is it is independent of subsidies, effort, and unemployment. 
 In Figure 3 we report the new equilibrium levels in the case of IOFs and co-operatives 
considering the (7) and (9) no-shirking conditions (NSCd), and comparing them with the 
Shapiro and Stiglitz equilibrium condition (NSCS-S), under the hypothesis that d assumes the 
same value in the two kinds of firm. The new equilibrium is E’ in the case of IOFs, while it is 
A’’ in the case of WOF. 
------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Since q and d trigger opposite impacts on the NSC, the final effect on the wage is 
ambiguous. While for relatively low values of q the equilibrium wage is expected to be 
higher than in the absence of employer opportunism, when d is lower than q (a situation that 
is expected to be common in worker co-operatives), the NSC shifts down relative to the initial 
position and a lower wage relative to the case in which employers’ opportunism is absent is 
expected. When monitoring is especially effective and employers’ opportunism is limited 
workers receive lower wages and the equilibrium is associated to higher levels of 
employment (point A’ in Figure 2). If improved monitoring is exactly compensated by the 
impact of employer opportunism, the NSC stays still and the equilibrium is at point A, like in 
the Shapiro and Stiglitz model. Finally, when employer opportunism has stronger impact than 
reduced monitoring, higher levels of unemployment and higher wages are expected (a 
situation common in IOFs). 
 
6. Investor owned firms and worker co-operatives: a comparison 
Within the framework of our efficiency wage model, these theoretical premises allow us 
to hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, the NSC in IOFs is positioned above and to the left of the 
NSC in worker co-operatives since: 
1) the necessity of increased monitoring activity requires a higher equilibrium level of 
the efficiency wage in IOFs. The NSC in IOFs shifts leftwards relative to its position 
in worker co-operatives, accounting for increased monitoring difficulties. The 
employer pays higher wages in order to sterilize the risk of shirking on the workers’ 
side (parameter q is lower in IOFs). Looking at WOFs, monitoring is more effective 
than in IOFs, which implies that q increases and the level of the non-shirking wage 
decreases, shifting the NSC curve downward. 
 2) (2a) contrasting interests in IOFs imply, ceteris paribus, that lower wages translate 
into higher profits. To compensate for the risk of distributive unfairness workers can 
demand higher wages. Concessionary behaviour by employers will push the NSC 
leftward, increasing the equilibrium level of wages and unemployment (parameter d 
higher in IOFs); (2b) similarly and more generally, within a principal-agent 
framework, diverging objectives between employer and employee in the presence of 
hierarchical relations can lead to both monetary and psychological costs due to 
hetero-direction, and suboptimal choices of the employer in the accumulation of 
workers’ human capital. These elements can push workers to ask compensation 
against the risk of losses. The threat of workers’ misbehaviour can induce employers 
to set higher than equilibrium wages (parameter d higher in IOFs); (2c) the risk of 
employer opportunism in terms of moral hazard, hidden action and abuse of 
authority resulting in lower wage levels and worse contractual conditions impose 
positive expected costs on workers. In order to shield themselves ex-ante against such 
costs, workers would threaten lower productivity levels and increase wage demands. 
Again, employers can prevent this risk by setting higher than equilibrium wages and 
using unemployment as a worker discipline device (parameter d higher in IOFs). 
In worker co-operatives the value of parameter d is always lower than its value in IOFs 
as the variables c (contrasting interests) and m (employer opportunism) are nil.
11
 Only 
hierarchical control (h) may be positive. However, as a matter of course, hierarchy is either 
absent in co-operatives or, when it exists, it is based on delegation and instrumental to the 
pursuit of members’ objectives, which are factored in co-operative governance through 
members’ control rights. Better involvement of workers reduces the risk of worker 
misbehaviour, reducing this way also the need for tight hierarchical relations. Hence, also in 
the case of hierarchical relations, we expect d and the position of the NSC to be lower in co-
operatives, and equilibrium to be characterized, ceteris paribus, by lower wages and higher 
employment.  
------------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
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 Substantively, the assumption of zero c and m variables in WOFs can be excessively simplifying. However, 
we stick to this assumption for the sake of clarity and simplicity at this stage of the development of the model.   
 In Figure 4, due to the higher than nil value of d, equilibrium in IOFs in found at point E’ 
on the NSCIOF curve, in which the equilibrium wage is higher and employment is lower 
relative to point E in the Shapiro and Stiglitz model (Figure 1). The NSC in co-operatives 
(labelled NSCWOF) is, in the general case, positioned to the right and below the NSCIOF. 
Equilibrium in co-operatives is found at point A’’’, in which wages are lower and 
employment is higher than in IOFs, coherently with prevailing empirical evidence. Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984) report, instead, the special case in which the parameters d and q exert 
equal (but opposed) effects on the NSC. Employer opportunism in IOFs is exactly 
counterbalanced by more effective monitoring (equilibrium points E and A in Figure 3). In 
this situation wages are generally higher in co-operatives, coherently with the Ward-Domar-
Vanek model of the labour managed firm. Effects on employment are instead unambiguous 
both in our model and in Shapiro and Stiglitz. A co-operative economy always performs 
better than a capitalist economy due to worker control. This result is further reinforced in our 
model, relative to the Shapiro and Stiglitz case, by the presence of lower monitoring costs, 
and lower incidence of hierarchical relations and of employer opportunism in co-operatives.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model demonstrates that Pareto optimality is 
an equilibrium solution not obtainable in the case of separation between owners and workers. 
Pareto optimality is obtained as new equilibrium level of the wage and of employment in 
correspondence with the intersection between the no-shirking condition curve and the 
average productivity of labour. The ensuing higher level of employment and wages 
corresponds to the implications of the Ward-Vanek-Domar model of the worker co-operative 
(labour managed firm in the theoretical model). Empirical evidence shows instead that 
observed market equilibrium has, in most cases, features that are at odd with these 
implications, since lower, not higher wages are usually observed in worker co-operatives. 
Our model deepens the analysis of the position of the NSC in the Shapiro and Stiglitz 
framework, aiming at clarifying the theoretical premises of empirical tests and at providing 
new explanation for the observed level of wages in co-operatives. We conclude that the 
equilibrium level of wages in co-operatives can be both higher and lower relative to IOFs, 
while employment is confirmed to be always higher. The final equilibrium level of wages in 
co-operatives is related to the position of the average productivity of labour schedule and its 
intersection with the NSC. We show that, given more efficient monitoring, the NSC curve in 
 co-operatives is always positioned below the NSC curve in IOFs. Additionally, employer 
opportunism related to failures of the employment contract strengthens the downward shift of 
the NSC in co-operatives. In this perspective, the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of worked 
owned firms is only a special case of a more general model in which the factoring in of 
monitoring costs and wage premiums compensating the expected costs of contract failures are 
able to reconcile the theory with empirical record.  
In terms of policy implications our approach implies that worked owned enterprises and 
worker co-operatives can complement, at the margin, mainstream, investor owned 
organizations, in improving the efficiency of the labour market. This minimal argument is 
sufficient to justify their economic and social role.   
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FIGURE 2: SOCIAL  OPTIMUM IN CASE OF WORKER’S CO-OPERATIVES 
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FIGURE 3: OPTIMUM IN CASE OF THE NSC INCLUDING THE PREMIUM FOR THE COSTS OF 
CONTRACTUAL FAILURES 
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 FIGURE 4: NEW OPTIMUM IN IOFs AND WORKER CO-OPERATIVES 
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